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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

NIC #01157-84/1
23 February 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH: National Intelligence Officer for Warning

FROM: [REDACTED]
National Intelligence Officer for Africa

SUBJECT: Warning and Forecast Report: Sub-Saharan Africa [REDACTED]

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Community representatives and specialists met on 21 February 1984 with the NIO/AF as chairman. The attached report has not been coordinated with the other participants but is being circulated to them. If they feel their views have been misinterpreted, or if they have significant additional concerns, I'll report further to you. [REDACTED]

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Attachment
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WARNING AND FORECAST REPORT: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

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NIGERIA

Analysts generally continue to maintain a wait-and-see attitude with respect to the outlook for the new military regime. Even though the regime has taken some positive steps, the Community is concerned that events could get out of hand suddenly and without warning. The new government is trying to do the right thing and tensions within the country appear to have eased somewhat. Talks are underway with the IMF--devaluation is a key sticking point--but a final agreement, a vital ingredient in sorting out the economic morass, is not expected before June or July. One key indicator for the future will be how the regime punishes former officials that have been detained on corruption charges. The attitudes of junior officers toward the regime's success or failure in dealing with the detainees is particularly important and

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may determine whether they support the regime or become disenchanted because of its failure to eradicate corruption, a key argument for mounting the coup against the Shagari government. It was also recognized that there may well be a group of junior officers who have no specific grievance and simply want a share of the power. Such a group would strike when they believed the moment was opportune and there would be no warning indicators.

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SUDAN

Community analysts see no end in sight to the insurgency in southern Sudan. [redacted] President Nimeiri's efforts to grapple with the problem have been ineffective and that the threat to internal stability posed by the insurgents will grow in the coming weeks. Thus far the insurgents have been highly successful in attacking key economic targets and forcing foreign firms (Chevron, for example) to cease work. This in turn impinges on the already serious economic situation, raising the possibility that over the next six months Nimeiri will lose the confidence of the international financial community thereby further eroding support for Nimeiri throughout the country if the economic outlook worsens.

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The actions Nimeiri has taken thus far to quiet the south have not been sufficient. Some southern leaders believe that it is not too late to resolve the problem if Nimeiri will act forcefully. Since mid-December he has acted to slow the general rate of deterioration, but he has not turned the situation around and has not moved decisively as he has done in previous crises. There

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CHAD

Although there has not been any fundamental change in the military situation, the movement of rebel and government units that has been taking place raises the possibility of increased skirmishing between the rival forces. Such activity also raises the possibility of hostile contact between the French and Libyans. These encounters are likely to be accidental, however, and would not be protracted.

Looking ahead, the French will continue to try and get Habre and Goukouni together and will sustain this effort at least until the OAU heads of state meeting. The French seem set for the long haul in Chad and there is no domestic pressure on Mitterrand to pull out. While looking to the OAU for a possible settlement--the consensus among analysts is that the OAU will not solve the problem--this will not preclude the French from dealing directly with the Libyans to resolve the situation. The NIO for Africa believes that the French may not be as willing to remain in Chad as long as the above analysis suggests, and that they will press more vigorously to find a political solution, in large part to avoid the potential for conflict with the Libyans.

FREE FORUM

Ethiopia-Somalia - Recent WSLF attacks inside Ethiopia and the subsequent Ethiopian retaliatory strikes against Somali targets raises the prospect of new tensions along the border.

Mozambique - Despite improving relations between South Africa and the Machel government, it is unclear whether Pretoria will sever connections with RENAMO, the insurgent organization the South Africans have been supporting inside Mozambique.

Zimbabwe/Botswana/Kenya - The DIO for Africa noted his concern with the continuing violence in southwestern Zimbabwe as government security forces seek to suppress the local dissidence that has festered in that area, the tribal homeland of the Ndebele who constitute the principal political opposition to Prime Minister Mugabe's party. The violence spills over into neighboring Botswana as Zimbabwe military personnel cross the border looking for dissident bands and encounter Botswana security forces. The tension between the two countries that has arisen as a result of these encounters could escalate and add one more element of instability to the southern African scene.

The NIO suggested that Zimbabwe, Kenya, and Mozambique be dealt with in depth at the next warning meeting.

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